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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">devter</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Развитие территорий</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Territory Development</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2412-8945</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Сибирский институт управления</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">ZCCFEM</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">devter-692</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЕ СИСТЕМЫ И ПРОЦЕССЫ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Гибридный протокол доказательства с нулевым разглашением для постквантовой криптографии</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>A Hybrid Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Post-Quantum Cryptography</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Кузнецов</surname><given-names>С. Б.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kuznetsov</surname><given-names>S. B.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Кузнецов Сергей Борисович — кандидат физико-математических наук, доцент, ведущий инженер-исследователь, Научный центр информационных технологий и искусственного интеллекта</p><p>Сочи</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Sergey B. Kuznetsov — Candidate of Sciences (Physics and Mathematics), Associate Professor, Leading Research Engineer, Scientific Center for Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence</p><p>Sochi</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">kuznetsov.sb@talantiuspeh.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Университет «Сириус», федеральная территория «Сириус»</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>University “Sirius”, Federal Territory “Sirius”</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>07</day><month>04</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1 (43)</issue><fpage>77</fpage><lpage>88</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Кузнецов С.Б., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Кузнецов С.Б.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kuznetsov S.B.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://devter.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/692">https://devter.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/692</self-uri><abstract><p>В работе представлен гибридный протокол доказательства с нулевым разглашением QZKP-Hybrid. Он создан для защиты информации от квантовых и классических атак. Протокол сочетает два подхода: устойчивую к квантовым атакам криптографию на решетках (LWE) и квантовые методы, использующие специальные квантовые состояния ∣ϕx⟩ и SWAP-тестирование. Протокол решает классическую задачу доказательства с нулевым разглашением (ZKP) в постквантовом контексте, находит применение в аутентификации, цифровых подписях и блокчейне. Протокол является неинтерактивным за счет применения преобразования Фиата — Шамира. Также используется запрет на клонирование квантовых состояний, что физически защищает секретную информацию от подделки. Безопасность QZKP-Hybrid доказана в модели UC-безопасности. Для этого применялась последовательность гибридных игр. Доказано, что никакой противник, даже с квантовым компьютером, не сможет взломать протокол. Реализация протокола возможна с помощью существующих технологий. Например, можно использовать оптоволоконные каналы для передачи квантовых состояний, что позволяет внедрять протокол в реальные системы. QZKP-Hybrid может применяться в постквантовых системах. Он подходит для задач, где нужно скрыть данные, но при этом подтвердить их достоверность. Протокол показал хороший баланс между безопасностью и производительностью. При размере параметра n = 512 он работает быстро и требует мало памяти. Это позволяет использовать его в мобильных устройствах и IoT-системах. В дальнейших исследованиях планируется изучить влияние декогеренции и шума на точность протокола, а также расширить модель на несколько участников.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The paper presents a hybrid zero-knowledge proof protocol, QZKP-Hybrid, designed to protect information from quantum and classical attacks. The protocol combines two approaches: quantum-resistant lattice cryptography (LWE) and quantum methods using special quantum states ∣ϕx⟩ and SWAP testing. The protocol solves the classical zero-knowledge proof problem (ZKP) in a post-quantum context and finds application in authentication, digital signatures, and blockchain. The protocol is non-interactive due to the Fiat-Shamir transformation. A prohibition on cloning quantum states is also used, physically protecting secret information from forgery. The security of QZKP-Hybrid is proven in the UC security model using a sequence of hybrid games. It is proven that no adversary, even with a quantum computer, can break the protocol. The protocol can be implemented using existing technologies. For example, fiber-optic channels can be used to transmit quantum states, allowing the protocol to be implemented in real-world systems. QZKP-Hybrid can be used in post-quantum systems. It is suitable for tasks where data must be hidden while still being verified. The protocol has demonstrated a good balance between security and performance. With a parameter size of n = 512, it operates quickly and requires little memory. This allows it to be used in mobile devices and IoT systems. Future research plans include studying the impact of decoherence and noise on protocol accuracy and extending the model to multiple participants.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>доказательство с нулевым разглашением (ZKP)</kwd><kwd>UC-безопасность</kwd><kwd>постквантовая криптография</kwd><kwd>квантовые протоколы</kwd><kwd>LWE</kwd><kwd>SWAP-тест</kwd><kwd>гибридная криптография</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>zero-knowledge proof (ZKP)</kwd><kwd>UC-security</kwd><kwd>post-quantum cryptography</kwd><kwd>quantum protocols</kwd><kwd>LWE</kwd><kwd>SWAP-test</kwd><kwd>hybrid cryptography</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group><funding-statement xml:lang="en">The results were obtained with financial support from the project “Technologies for Countering Previously Unknown Quantum Cyber Threats”, implemented under the state program of the federal territory Sirius “Scientific and Technological Development of the Federal Territory Sirius” (Agreement No. 23-03 dated September 27, 2024).</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">CRYSTALS-Dilithium: A Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme / J. 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